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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The plaintiff appeals an Order entered June 14, 1988 by the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, granting summary judgment 
to the defendant, Dr. Hurst, on plaintiff's claims of dental 
malpractice. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal based 
on § 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiff's appeal raises two issues: 
1. Based on the record before the trial court, was there 
a genuine issue of fact with respect to plaintiff's claim that 
Dr. Hurst's treatment of her was below the applicable standard 
of care and with respect to her claim that Dr. Hurst's treat-
ment caused her alleged injuries? and, 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying 
plaintiff's Motion for Continuance of the June 6, 1988 hearing 
on Dr. Hurst's Second Motion for Summary Judgment? 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT RULES AND STATUTES 
The following rules and statutes are relied upon by 
Dr. Hurst in this brief: 
1. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affi-
davit shall be attached thereto or served there-
with. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
Section 78-14-5(1), U.C.A. (1953 as amended): 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed 
that what the health care provider did was either 
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. 
For a patient to recover damages from a health 
care provider in an action based upon the pro-
vider's failure to obtain informed consent, the 
patient must prove the following: 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries 
arising out of the health care rendered; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health 
care rendered was the proximate cause of 
personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
Section 78-14-4(1), U.C.A. (1953 as amended): 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four 
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years after the date of the alleged act, 
omission, neglect or occurrence . . . . 
Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate head-
ings and in the order here indicated: 
(7) a statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of 
the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the court below. There shall 
follow a statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review. All state-
ments of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record (see Paragraph (e)). 
(e) References in briefs to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or 
to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant 
to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits 
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is 
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in 
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the transcript at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If 
the court shall determine that a motion made or 
appeal taken under these rules is either frivo-
lous or for delay, it shall award just damages 
and single or double costs, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a tort action in which plaintiff alleges dental 
malpractice. (R. at 2-5, Complaint) Plaintiff's claims arise 
from orthodontic treatment rendered to her by Dr. Hurst, an 
orthodontist licensed to practice in the State of Utah and a 
Diplomate of the American Board of Orthodontics. (R. at 15, 
Aff'd of J. Earl Hurst, D.D.S., M.S., 1f 1) 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
Dr. Hurst because plaintiff was unable to adduce any expert tes-
timony to establish the elements of her prima facie case and the 
uncontroverted facts in the record establish that Dr. Hurst's 
treatment of plaintiff was in accordance with the applicable 
standard of care and did not cause her alleged injuries. 
(R. at 196 & 197) 
In June 1972 plaintiff, then 11 years old, was referred to 
Dr. Hurst for orthodontic care by her general dentist, Jack 
Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S., following a swimming pool accident and 
injury to her lower front teeth. (R. at 16, Aff'd of Hurst 
1f 2; R. at 38, Aff'd of Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S, 1f 3) 
Dr. Rasmussen referred plaintiff to Dr. Hurst because of crowd-
ing of her lower anterior (front) teeth and because he felt the 
treatment of the lower right central incisor, the most severely 
injured tooth, should be considered in the context of a plan 
for orthodontic care. (R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen if 3) 
When plaintiff presented to Dr. Hurst in June 1972 the 
lower right central incisor was fractured and the pulp exposed, 
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causing a large abscess and fistula. Root canal therapy had 
been performed on that tooth, but the prognosis was poor. 
Three other lower anterior teeth were also abscessed, but the 
prognosis for those teeth was better, given appropriate endo-
dontic care. Orthodontically, plaintiff's lower front teeth 
were crowded. (R. at 16, Aff'd of Hurst 1f1f 2 & 3; R. at 38, 
Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 3) 
After careful diagnostic evaluation and consultations with 
Dr. Rasmussen and plaintiff's father, it was agreed by them and 
Dr. Hurst that the injured lower right central incisor would be 
extracted and its space used to reduce the crowding of the 
remaining lower anterior teeth, through the application of 
braces. It was believed that removal of the lower right 
central incisor would also help resolve the infection around 
the other lower anterior teeth. (R. at 16, 17 & 20, Aff*d of 
Hurst 1f1f 4 & 11; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 4) 
In accordance with the treatment plan presented by 
Dr. Hurst and agreed upon by Dr. Rasmussen and plaintiff's 
father, the lower right central incisor was extracted and in 
September 1972 Dr. Hurst commenced plaintiff's orthodontic 
treatment. By July 1974, in Dr. Hurst's and Dr. Rasmussen's 
judgment, the goal of the orthodontic treatment had been 
achieved and a good result had been obtained. The lower 
anterior teeth had been moved, reducing the crowding, and had 
evenly taken up the space of the extracted lower right central 
incisor. (R. at 17, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 6; R. at 38 & 39, Aff'd 
of Rasmussen 1f1f 5 & 7) From 1974 through 1982 plaintiff 
visited Dr. Hurst's office periodically, but only for minor 
adjustments to her retainers or for new retainers. Dr. Hurst 
did not provide any treatment to plaintiff after 1974 which 
changed the position of her lower teeth. (R. at 17-18, Aff'd 
of Hurst 1f1f 6 & 7; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 5) 
In March 1985 plaintiff visited Dr. Hurst and requested 
minor adjustments in the alignment of her upper anterior 
teeth. Dr. Hurst had not previously treated plaintiff's upper 
teeth. Bands were applied to plaintiff's upper teeth in March 
1985 and removed in September 1985. Plaintiff has not com-
plained or asserted any claims regarding the adjustment of her 
upper teeth during 1985. (R. at 17-18, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 7; R. 
at 3-4, Plaintiff's Complaint 1f1f 7-9) 
In September 1985 plaintiff complained to Dr. Hurst that 
she wanted her lower right central incisor and her wisdom 
teeth, which had also been extracted, but not by Dr. Hurst, 
replaced because that was the way God created her. She also 
requested that Dr. Hurst return her lower anterior teeth to 
their original positions. Dr. Hurst advised plaintiff it would 
not be in her interest or medically advisable to attempt to 
restore her lower anterior teeth to their original positions 
and that such an effort could possibly damage her then healthy 
mouth. He further advised her that even if her requests were 
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feasible, it would cost her a substantial amount of money for 
no benefit. Plaintiff persisted in her request and Dr. Hurst 
agreed to make a plaster study model of her teeth for evalua-
tion. After making the plaster study model and evaluating it, 
Dr. Hurst advised plaintiff that it was not advisable to move 
the lower anterior teeth back to their original positions and 
refused to undertake such treatment. (R. at 18, Aff *d of Hurst 
1f 8) 
When Dr. Hurst refused plaintiff's request, she became 
angry and began harassing him and his office personnel. Over 
the next several months, Dr. Hurst received telephone calls 
from eight other orthodontists, a specialist in craniofacial 
pain, an endodontist, and a general dentist, advising that 
plaintiff had made similar requests to them. Each reported he 
had declined to undertake the requested treatment and expressed 
the opinion that plaintiff's orthodontic condition was then 
healthy and normal. (R. at 19, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 9) 
On March 3, 1986, Dr. Hurst received a telephone call from 
Richard Randle, D.D.S., M.S., an orthodontist who had examined 
plaintiff. Dr. Randle advised Dr. Hurst that plaintiff had 
threatened to kill Dr. Hurst and then kill herself if she did 
not get the treatment she was requesting. (R. at 19, Aff'd of 
Hurst 1f 10; R. at 26, Aff'd of Richard E. Randle, D.D.S., 
M.S.) Out of concern over this threat and plaintiff's contin-
uing harassment, Dr. Hurst first contacted Dr. Duncan Wallace, 
a psychiatrist who had been treating plaintiff, and then 
contacted the State Attorney General's Office. He was referred 
to a city prosecutor, who commenced a proceeding against plain-
tiff and obtained an order restraining her from any contact 
with Dr. Hurst for a period of six months. At the end of the 
six month period, Dr. Hurst received a Notice of Intent to 
Commence a malpractice action. (R. at 19, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 10) 
This action was filed August 5, 1987. (R. at 2) On 
November 2, 1987 defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. at 45) supported by the Affidavits of Dr. Hurst, (R. at 15) 
Wallace B. Brown, D.D.S., an endodontist who treated plain-
tiff's lower front teeth which were injured in the swimming 
pool accident (R. at 34), Richard E. Randle, D.D.S., M.S., an 
orthodontist who examined plaintiff in January 1986 (R. at 23), 
James L. Guinn, D.M.D., a dentist specializing in craniofacial 
pain and temporomandibular joint dysfunction who examined plain-
tiff in July 1986 (R. at 37), Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S., 
plaintiff's general dentist (R. at 37), and George R. Parker, 
D.D.S., M.S., an orthodontist who examined plaintiff in 
December 1985 (R. at 41). 
These affidavits established the following: (1) that the 
treatment plan outlined for plaintiff in 1972 by Dr. Hurst was 
appropriate (R. at 20, 26, 39 & 44), (2) that the orthodontic 
treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst to plaintiff was, in all 
respects, within the standard of care ordinarily exercised by 
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other orthodontists (R. at 20, 26 & 44), (3) that the result 
from the orthodontic treatment was good (R. 20, 39 & 44), (4) 
that the endodontic damage to plaintiffs lower anterior teeth 
in 1972 was caused by trauma to her teeth and not by the 
orthodontic treatment (R. at 20 & 35), (5) that Dr. Hurst's 
treatment did not cause any of plaintiff's teeth to die, did 
not cause any damage to facial nerves and did not cause any 
damage to her jaw or bite (R. at 20, 26, 28 & 39), and (6) that 
any headaches, tension, pain or depression suffered by plain-
tiff were not caused or contributed to by her orthodontic 
treatment. (R. at 6, 26 & 28) 
The bases of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment were 
that the foregoing facts established by the affidavits filed in 
support of the Motion were uncontroverted, that plaintiff could 
not establish a prima facie case without competent expert testi-
mony regarding the applicable standard of care and causation, 
and that plaintiff's claims were based on treatment rendered 
more than four years prior to commencing this action and were 
thus barred by the four year statute of repose in S 78-14-4, 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). (R. at 45-57) Plaintiff filed 
affidavits of herself (R. at 64), Charles Edward Gordon (R. at 
65) and Gayle Dean Hunt (R. at 66), her father. None of those 
affiants set forth any credentials qualifying them to render 
expert opinions regarding the standard of care for orthodon-
tists, the quality of the orthodontic care rendered by 
Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's alleged present condition 
or symptoms. Additionally, plaintiff filed a letter signed by 
Joseph W. Stobbe, Jr., D.M.D., which stated "the purpose of 
this letter is only to state that I began treatment of Mary 
Alene Hunt on June 15, 1987 for temporomandibular joint 
dysfunction." The letter was not signed under oath and did not 
comment on Dr. Hurst's treatment of plaintiff or the cause of 
her alleged temporomandibular joint dysfunction. (R. at 70) 
On December 21, 1987, Judge Frederick heard Dr. Hurst's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, including arguments by plaintiff's 
counsel, and granted the motion. (R. at 63) 
In January 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from 
Judgment supported by an Affidavit of Scott Daynes, D.D.S. (R. 
at 86 & 88) Plaintiff's motion was heard on January 25, 1988 
and on January 26, 1988, Judge Frederick issued a minute entry, 
granting plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment and 
vacating the Summary Judgment. (R. at 85 & 89) An Order of 
Summary Judgment had not been signed. 
On March 18, 1988, defendant took Dr. Daynes' deposition. 
The Affidavit of Dr. Daynes, which had been the basis for 
vacating the Summary Judgment, stated in pertinent part: 
4. Miss Hunt has explained that in 1972 she had an 
injured front tooth removed and orthodontia was used 
to restore her bite. 
7. I don't think it's normal procedure to take out a 
tooth to solve an orthodontic problem as described by 
Miss Hunt. 
8. Assuming the foregoing I can state that I believe 
Miss Hunt has been dentally mistreated and this is evi-
denced by the fact that recent alignment of her bite 
by a splint (band-aid approach) has released her from 
years of pain and self-image problems. 
9. Miss Hunt describes classic signs of the previ-
ously unidentified consequences of the procedure of 
shifting bite through orthodontia. 
10. I further believe that emotional problems can 
result from undiagnosed and unabated pain and believe 
that Miss Hunt is a member of the class of young white 
females we have discovered are especially susceptible 
to the orthodontic consequences above described. (R. 
at 88) 
In his deposition, Dr. Daynes testified: 
1. That he is a general dentist and does not claim 
expertise in orthodontics. (Depo. of Scott P. 
Daynes, D.D.S., at 5, 6 & 46) 
2. That when he signed the Affidavit, he was not 
aware that extraction of lower incisors was 
appropriate and acceptable orthodontic treatment 
for reducing crowding of lower anterior teeth. 
(id. at 48 & 49) 
3. That since signing the Affidavit, he had con-
sulted an orthodontist with whom he was familiar 
and it is now his understanding that extraction 
of incisors to reduce crowding of lower anterior 
teeth is acceptable orthodontic practice and in 
many cases the preferred treatment. (Jd. at 48 & 
49) 
4. That at the time he signed the Affidavit he had 
not seen x-rays of the lower right central inci-
sor extracted in 1972. (Id. at 17, 23, 24 & 56) 
5. That after having an opportunity to review the 
x-ray of the extracted tooth at his deposition, 
he agreed with Dr. Hurst's assessment that the 
tooth had a poor prognosis and that extracting 
the tooth was reasonable. (Id. at 56-58) 
6. That based on his examination of the plaintiff, 
the history he took from her, his review of 
Dr. Guinn's report and his discussions with 
Dr. Parker, an orthodontist, it is not his 
opinion that Dr. Hurst was in any way negligent 
or breached the standard of care. (Id. at 55-56) 
7. That orthodontic treatment is only one of many 
possible causes of plaintiff's symptoms. (I_d. at 
43-46) 
8. That he never intended to state or suggest that 
the orthodontic treatment rendered to plaintiff 
by Dr. Hurst was or probably was the cause of her 
problems. (Id. at 45-46) 
Based on Dr. Daynes' deposition, defendant filed a Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish the 
Deposition of Scott P. Daynes, D.D.S., in May 1988. (R. at 
167) In opposition to defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiff filed an affidavit of Dallas E. Murdoch, 
D.D.S. of Soda Springs, Idaho. (R. at 175) Dr. Murdoch 
expressed his opinion that plaintiff had an "abnormal occlusal 
relationship," but no opinion was expressed regarding the cause 
of that condition or the propriety of the treatment rendered by 
Dr. Hurst. (R. at 175) On June 6, 1988, ten months after this 
action was commenced, Judge Frederick granted defendant's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. at 171) and on June 14, 
1988 the Order and Summary Judgment from which this appeal is 
taken was entered. (R. at 196) 
After Judge Frederick granted defendant's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Deny Defendant's 
-12-
Proposed Order: Motion to Open Judgment: Motion for Relief 
from Judgment: Motion for Stay of Proceedings" (R. at 178), an 
Affidavit of John R. Bybee, who purports to have a Ph.D. in 
"physiology and the training of science teachers" (R. at 185), 
an Affidavit signed by plaintiff, dated June 10, 1988, with an 
attached "resume" of alleged facts (R. at 186), another 
Affidavit dated June 1, 1988, signed by plaintiff (R. at 191), 
a letter dated June 8, 1988 to plaintiffs counsel from 
Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys (R. at 192), a pro-
posed contract dated June 1988 from Technical Advisory Service 
for Attorneys (R. at 195), a letter dated June 7, 1988, to 
plaintiff's counsel from the Medical Quality Foundation (R. at 
193), a cassette tape, represented to be the tape of a lecture 
presented by Henry Tanner, D.D.S., a Salt Lake City prosthodon-
tist, in September 1986 (R. at 199) and a two-page transcript, 
represented to be a transcript of certain portions of 
Dr. Tanner's lecture (R. at 183). 
On June 20, 1988, plaintiff's motions titled "Motion to 
Deny Defendant's Proposed Order: Motion to Open Judgment: 
Motion for Relief from Judgment: Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings" were argued to the court and denied by Judge 
Frederick. (R. at 200-202) 
On June 21, 1988, after the court had denied plaintiff's 
motions, plaintiff filed a document entitled "Additional 
Opinions" (R. at 203) with two attachments: a letter "dictated 
but not read" by Gordon J. Christensen, D.D.S, Ph.D. (R. at 
204), and a handwritten note from John Richard Aoki, M.D., an 
otorhinolaryngologist. (R. at 205) Dr. Christensen's letter 
is not a sworn affidavit, is not signed by Dr. Christensen, 
states it was not read by Dr. Christensen and does not express 
an opinion that Dr. Hurst's treatment was in any way negligent 
or in violation of the applicable standard of care. (R. at 
204) Dr. Aoki's note, likewise, is not a sworn affidavit and 
does not express an opinion concerning the treatment rendered 
by Dr. Hurst. (R. at 205) 
On July 14, 1988, plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal. 
(R. at 246) Thereafter, on September 20, 1988, plaintiff filed 
a Motion for Relief from Judgment and an affidavit of Dennis J. 
Michaelson, D.M.D., M.S., purportedly an orthodontist in 
Chubbuck, Idaho. These documents are the last twu pages in the 
Court file before the clerk's index and are not numbered as 
part of the record, presumably because they were filed after 
the Notice of Appeal. The affidavit does not express any 
opinion concerning the orthodontic treatment rendered by 
Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's present alleged symp-
toms. There is no mailing certificate or affidavit of service 
evidencing service of the Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Dr. Michaelson's sworn statement on defendant and defendant's 
counsel hereby represents that copies were not received and 
receipt of appellant's brief (Exhibit 11) was the first notice 
to defendant of the Michaelson affidavit. 
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The letter from Grant B. Cannon, D.D.S., M.D., attached to 
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 10 is not found in the record and 
likewise was never served on defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should affirm the Summary Judgment entered by 
the District Court because there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. 
Plaintiff alleges Dr. Hurst committed dental malpractice 
and that his treatment caused various injuries. To establish a 
prima facie case she must prove three elements: 
1. The standard of care applicable to Dr. Hurst, 
2. That Dr. Hurst's treatment of her breached the 
applicable standard of care, and 
3. That the substandard treatment proximately caused her 
alleged injuries. 
Dr. Hurst filed affidavits of six competent dentists, 
including himself, expressing competent expert testimony that 
his treatment of plaintiff was appropriate and complied in all 
respects with the applicable standard of care and that his 
treatment did not cause plaintiff's alleged injuries. 
The record contains no competent expert testimony 
controverting the affidavits filed by Dr. Hurst or otherwise 
raising a question of fact with respect to the elements of 
plaintiff's prima facie case- The only affidavit filed by plain-
tiff which even purports to express an expert opinion regarding 
the treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's 
alleged injuries is the affidavit of Scott Daynes, D.D.S. 
After Dr. Daynes' affidavit was filed, his deposition was 
taken. At his deposition, Dr. Daynes testified that he is a 
general dentist and when he signed the affidavit, he was not 
familiar with the standard of care ordinarily exercised by 
orthodontists with respect to extraction of lower incisors to 
correct crowding of lower anterior teeth. After signing the 
affidavit Dr. Daynes consulted an orthodontist and learned that 
lower incisors are often extracted as part of orthodontic 
treatment. At his deposition, Dr. Daynes admitted he made an 
erroneous assumption when he signed the affidavit and testified 
it was not his opinion that Dr. Hurst breached the standard of 
care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists. 
Additionally, Dr. Daynes viewed the 1972 x-ray of plaintiff's 
lower right central incisor at his deposition and testified 
that in his opinion, extraction of the tooth was reasonable. 
Dr. Daynes further testified that orthodontic treatment was 
only one of many possible causes of plaintiff's alleged 
injuries and that he has no opinion as to the actual cause of 
her symptoms. He also explained that by signing the affidavit 
he did not intend to express the opinion that plaintiff's 
alleged symptoms were caused by Dr. Hurst's treatment. 
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Plaintiff's argument that res ipsa loquitur applies and 
therefore no expert testimony is required is without merit. 
First, res ipsa was not raised in the trial court. Second, res 
ipsa only applies when the alleged incident would not normally 
occur without negligence, the instrumentalities causing the 
injuries are under the control of the defendant and the 
incident occurred irrespective of any participation by the 
plaintiff. Those foundational requirements for res ipsa are 
not present in this case. Finally, res ipsa creates an 
inference of negligence only and does not affect the require-
ment of proving causation with competent expert testimony. 
Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Hurst failed to obtain her 
informed consent is likewise without merit. First, the claim 
of failure to obtain informed consent was not raised in the 
trial court and therefore cannot be considered by this Court on 
appeal. Second, to prevail on a theory of failure to obtain 
informed consent, plaintiff must prove that the alleged 
unauthorized treatment was the proximate cause of her alleged 
injuries. As discussed above, the affidavits filed by 
Dr. Hurst establish that his treatment did not cause plaintiff's 
alleged injuries and are incontroverted. There is therefore no 
issue of fact regarding causation. Finally, there is no issue 
of fact regarding informed consent. Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen 
testify in their affidavits that Dr. Hurst explained the pro-
posed treatment to plaintiff's father and that her father agreed 
to the treatment. Plaintiff's father admits in his affidavit 
that the proposed treatment was explained to him and he does 
not dispute that he agreed to the treatment. Plaintiff was a 
minor and her father was authorized, by statute, to consent to 
health care for her. 
On June 6, 1988, the day scheduled for hearing Dr. Hurst's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Continuance asking the court to continue the hearing at 
least three weeks. The trial court's denial of that motion was 
not an abuse of discretion because the lawsuit had been pending 
for ten months, the affidavits of Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle, 
Dr. Guinn, Dr. Brown, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker had been on 
file over seven months and plaintiff's Notice of Intent to 
Commence a malpractice action had been filed nearly two and 
one-half years earlier. Additionally, four months earlier the 
court had vacated a summary judgment giving plaintiff 
additional time to file appropriate counter-affidavits. The 
lower court's denial of the Motion for Continuance was 
therefore not an abuse of discretion. 
The treatment which plaintiff claims was negligent was 
rendered in 1972 through 1974. Section 78-14-4, U.C.A. (1953 
as amended) provides that no malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought unless is it commenced 
within four years after the date of the alleged negligent 
treatment. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims are barred. 
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Dr. Hurst contends that this court should affirm the 
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court because plaintiff 
has failed to cite any portion of the record in support of her 
appeal. Without citing facts in the record which support 
plaintiff's contentions on appeal, she cannot demonstrate any 
factual basis for reversing the lower court. Additionally, 
Dr. Hurst contends this appeal is frivolous because it lacks 
any reasonable legal or factual basis and the court should 
therefore award him double costs and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE OR CAUSATION 
WITHOUT COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THERE 
IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT 
DR. HURST'S TREATMENT WAS NEGLIGENT OR 
CAUSED ANY INJURY. 
To establish a prima facie case in a medical/dental mal-
practice case, the plaintiff must present competent evidence 
establishing the following elements: 
1. The standard of care ordinarily exercised by practi-
tioners in the defendant's field of practice, 
2. That the defendant departed from the standard of care 
ordinarily exercised by other practitioners in the same field 
of practice, and 
3. That such departure from the applicable standard of 
care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 
2d 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 94 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hoopilaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Except in the 
unusual case where the propriety or impropriety of the medical 
or dental treatment is within the common knowledge and experi-
ence of lay persons, these elements of a plaintiff's prima 
facie case must be established by competent expert testimony. 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959); 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra; Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 
1980); Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra; Hoopilaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, supra. 
The rationale for requiring expert testimony is compel-
ling. The issues presented by medical/dental malpractice cases 
generally involve technical questions and judgments beyond the 
knowledge and experience of laymen. Without the assistance of 
expert testimony, the finder of fact would be left to impermis-
sibly base its verdict on speculation and conjecture with 
respect to the standard of care, whether the standard of care 
was met or breached and whether the treatment caused the 
alleged injuries. 
This case clearly does not fall within the exception to the 
general rule. It cannot be said that laymen are sufficiently 
knowledgeable to determine the propriety of Dr. Hurst's ortho-
dontic treatment or whether such treatment caused the injuries 
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of which plaintiff complains without help from experts in the 
field of orthodontics. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot rely upon 
mere assertions or her own opinions. She must produce competent 
expert testimony that Dr. Hurst violated the applicable standard 
of care and that his treatment caused her alleged injuries, to 
make a prima facie case or create a question of fact. 
A. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because The Record In 
This Case Contains Incontroverted And Competent Expert 
Testimony That Dr. Hurst's Treatment Of Plaintiff 
Complied In All Respects With The Applicable Standard 
Of Care And Did Not Cause Her Alleged Injuries. 
In his affidavit, Dr. Hurst outlines the treatment he 
provided plaintiff, explains the objectives and results of the 
treatment, and testifies that the treatment plan was appropri-
ate, that the treatment rendered was in all respects within the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists 
and that there were no complications of the treatment. (R. at 
15-22) Additionally, the record contains the following: 
1. The Affidavit of Richard E. Randle, D.D.S., M.S., a 
practicing orthodontist in the Salt Lake City community for 
twenty years, who examined plaintiff in January 1986. (R. at 
23-26) Dr. Randle incorporates in his affidavit, a statement 
which he dictated at the time of his examination of the 
plaintiff, which he testifies accurately states his findings 
and opinions. It states: 
I advised her (plaintiff) that her tooth allignment 
and bite were within normal limits and that her 
previous orthodontist had done a good job in straight-
ening and alligning her teeth . . . 
After several visits, it became apparent to me that 
her problem was psychological or emotional rather than 
a physical problem relating to her dentition . . . 
In my opinion, the orthodontic treatment done by 
Dr. Hurst has been very satisfactory, and my hope is 
that Mary can get professional help in overcoming her 
emotional problems. (R. at 26) 
2. The Affidavit of George R. Parker, D.D.S., M.S., a 
practicing orthodontist for seventeen years, who examined 
plaintiff in late 1985. (R. at 41-44) Dr. Parker also 
incorporates in his affidavit, a letter which he dictated to 
plaintiff on December 3, 1985, which he attests accurately 
states his findings and opinions with respect to her ortho-
dontic condition at that time and her prior orthodontic 
treatment. He states: 
After a thorough review of your mouth and occlusion we 
have determined that to do any thing further in 
orthodontics would not be to your advantage. The 
results you have obtained are well within the normal 
range of acceptable treatment and we feel that you 
would be advised to leave the teeth and surrounding 
tissues as they are. 
You are really a very pretty girl and have much to 
offer and we feel like you should not concentrate your 
time and efforts on this situation. If you were my 
very own daughter the advice would be the same. (R. 
at 44) 
3. The Affidavit of James L. Guinn, D.M.D., a practicing 
dentist in this community who limits his practice to cranio-
facial pain and T.M.J, dysfunctions. (R. at 27-33) Dr. Guinn 
examined plaintiff on July 30, 1986, and testifies: 
In my opinion, Mary's jaw and bite have not been 
adversely altered or affected in any way by her ortho-
dontic treatment. If she has in fact been suffering 
facial pain or tension, it has not been caused by any 
malocclusion or poor bite relationship. (R. at 28) 
4. The Affidavit of Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S., a 
practicing general dentist in this community for over twenty 
years and plaintiff's general dentist since prior to 1972. (R, 
at 37-40) Dr. Rasmussen testifies: 
In my opinion, the treatment plan was entirely 
appropriate and was the best course of treatment 
available. In my opinion, the result of the ortho-
dontic treatment was good and the objectives of the 
treatment plan were fully achieved. 
I am aware of Mary's claims and complaints regarding 
the orthodontic treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst 
through repeated discussions with Mary and with 
Dr. Hurst. In my opinion, Mary's complaints are 
psychological or emotional in origin and are not 
factually or medically related to the orthodontic 
treatment rendered. (R. at 39) 
There is no competent evidence in the record controverting 
the testimony of Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle, Dr. Parker, Dr. Guinn 
and Dr. Rasmussen regarding Dr. Hurst's treatment or causa-
tion. According to Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P., plaintiff 
cannot rely upon mere allegations, but must set forth specific 
facts by competent testimony to create a question of fact and 
avoid summary judgment. 
Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. provides: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matter stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories or further affidavits. When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
Of all the letters, statements and/or affidavits submitted 
by plaintiff to the trial court and directly to this court, the 
only one that purports to express an expert opinion regarding 
the propriety of Dr. Hurst's treatment or comments on possible 
causes of plaintiff's alleged injuries is the Affidavit of 
Scott Daynes, D.D.S. All but the affidavits of Daynes and 
Stobbe were filed after the second summary judgment was 
granted. Dr. Daynes' affidavit and deposition testimony are 
addressed below. All of the other statements, letters and 
affidavits from purported experts and the reasons they do not 
present competent evidence raising a question of fact are 
addressed separately in the Addendum to this brief. 
The trial court vacated the first Summary Judgment based on 
Dr. Daynes' affidavit. Thereafter, Dr. Daynes' deposition was 
taken. Based on a review of Dr. Daynes' deposition testimony, 
the trial court concluded that his testimony did not create a 
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question of fact with respect to negligence or causation and 
again granted Summary Judgment. 
In his affidavit (R. at 88), Dr. Daynes stated that in his 
opinion orthodontia "can" cause a change of bite, which "could 
cause" stress and pain in other parts of the body and that 
plaintiff describes signs and symptoms which can result from a 
change of bite due to orthodontia. His affidavit does not 
state that in his opinion the orthodontic treatment rendered by 
Dr. Hurst caused or even "probably" caused plaintiff's alleged 
symptoms. 
Regarding the propriety of the orthodontic treatment plan 
followed by Dr. Hurst, Dr. Daynes' affidavit states that he did 
not "think" it is normal procedure to take out a tooth to solve 
an orthodontic problem as described by plaintiff and that 
"assuming" he is correct, he believes plaintiff has been 
dentally mistreated. 
Dr. Daynes' deposition revealed that he signed the affidavit 
prepared by plaintiff's counsel, as a favor to his friend 
Mr. Macri, after only one cursory examination of plaintiff, and 
without reviewing any records or reports from dentists who had 
previously treated or examined plaintiff. (Depo. of Daynes at 
17, 23-27 & 54) More importantly, however, Dr. Daynes 
explained in his deposition that he is not an orthodontist and 
the statement in his affidavit that he believed plaintiff had 
been "dentally mistreated" was based on his perception as a 
general dentist that it is not normal procedure to extract an 
incisor for orthodontic treatment. His understanding as a 
general dentist was that bicuspids are normally extracted to 
treat overcrowding. Also, he had not seen the x-ray of the 
incisor which was extracted. After signing the affidavit, how-
ever, Dr. Daynes consulted an orthodontist and learned that 
extraction of incisors is not unusual in orthodontic treatment 
and is often the treatment of choice. (Depo. of Daynes at 5, 
6, 46, 48-51, 55 & 56) Additionally, at his deposition 
Dr. Daynes had an opportunity to view a June 1972 x-ray of 
plaintiff's lower right central incisor. After reviewing the 
x-ray, Dr. Daynes testified as follows: 
Q. Based on that x-ray, you would not now have any 
criticism of that extraction of that tooth; is that 
right? 
A. No, I have no criticism of the extraction of the 
tooth for the dental reason, for the tooth reason. I 
only had a question for the orthodontic reason. I 
hope I clarified that, that I improved my opinion in 
that area. (Depo. of Daynes at 58) 
Dr. Daynes further testified: 
Q. Okay. And now that you've talked to Dr. Parker, 
what is your opinion concerning the treatment rendered 
by Dr. Hurst? 
A. Well, rather than get into Dr. Hurst but in 
general, it seems to be guite normal treatment to 
consider removing the incisors when tooth room and 
spacing is needed. 
And I didn't know that and now I know that, and I can 
see that as a fact, and that's what happened to Mary 
evidently, and that seems to be the standard of care 
of a conventional orthodontic treatment. 
Q. Based on all the information you have now, your 
examination of Mary, the history you took from her, 
Dr. Guinn's report, your discussions with Dr. Parker 
and all other information that you have concerning 
Mary today, do you either have the opinion or intend 
to express any opinion in this litigation that 
Dr. Hurst was in any way negligent or breached the 
standard of care? Is that question too long? 
A. No, sir, I understand the question. I want to 
pause and reflect on it because it's obviously an 
important question, and I feel there has been no 
significant treatment which directly caused Mary's 
problem either directly or indirectly, and I don't 
look at the orthodontic treatment as the cause of 
Mary's problem per se. It may be part of the problem 
development, it may in some way be connected with it. 
I just don't know, and I don't have any way of saying 
that. I don't mean to say that. If I might, I'd 
really have to reflect on this number eight paragraph 
in my affidavit. I think I was beyond the bounds of 
my normal dental experience in that statement, and I 
kind of didn't mean to say what it says there. I 
didn't sit down and help to make up this 
sentence. . . . 
(Depo. of Daynes at 50, 55-56) 
Regarding causation, Dr. Daynes acknowledged James L. 
Guinn, D.M.D., as an expert in temporomandibular joint 
dysfunction and one to whom he would defer and look for 
guidance regarding issues of bite alignment and T.M.J. 
dysfunction. (Depo. of Daynes at 25-26) Dr. Daynes also 
testified that he does not disagree with or dispute Dr. Guinn's 
finding that plaintiff's symptoms are not explained by any jaw 
or temporomandibular joint problems and that, in his opinion, 
her jaw and bite have not been adversely altered or affected in 
any way by her orthodontic treatment. (R. at 28, Aff'd of 
James L. Guinn, D.M.D. 1[ 4; Depo. of Daynes at 38) Addition-
ally, after identifying approximately a dozen possible causes 
of plaintiff's symptoms, Dr. Daynes testified as follows: 
Q. And as I understand your testimony, of all those 
possible causes of Mary's symptoms, you're not able to 
express an opinion as to what the actual cause is? 
A. Absolutely. I wouldn't try to. 
Q. I'll hand you deposition exhibit 3 to your 
deposition, which is a copy of the affidavit you've 
previously signed, I believe, at Mr. Maori's request; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would it be fair, then, based on the testimony 
you have given, to say that any references in your 
affidavit to bite or T.M.J, problems as a cause of 
Mary's symptoms were intended only to be an expression 
by you that was a possible or one of many possible 
causes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you intend in any way to express an opinion 
by that affidavit that bite or T.M.J, problems were 
the cause of Mary's symptoms? 
A. Not directly. I had no strong feeling and have 
none, and I hoped I presented none, that these 
problems, particularly the T.M.J, problem, resulted 
directly from her orthodontic treatment. All I felt 
was that there is a possible link, and "possible" is 
the word that's most important there, not that it's 
caused or a direct connection. 
(Depo. of Daynes at 43-46) 
Perhaps Dr. Daynes' testimony regarding "the intended 
meaning of his affidavit is best summarized by the following 
questions asked by plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Daynes' answers 
thereto: 
Mr. Macri Q: And do you recall when I suggested Mary 
was to come in to you what the purpose was? It wasn't 
to treat her; is that correct? 
A. No. No, it wasn't to treat her; it was to give 
an evaluation or just to "look at Mary." 
Q. And wasn't it true and reflected by the affi-
davit, defendant's exhibit 3, that the statements were 
designed to convey the message that a restructuring of 
teeth can cause alignment problems which cause pain 
and stress and are consistent with T.M.J.? 
A. Yes. By what you're saying, that it's possible, 
an orthodontic cause can be considered as to why 
there's a T.M.J, problem, yes, I would agree with that 
along with the other problems which may cause a T.M.J, 
problem that we mentioned. 
Q. And you weren't asked anything about Dr. Hurst? 
A. I don't think his name was mentioned, no. 
Q. And the words "dentally mistreated" were the 
words that I chose to describe? 
A. Yes. You wrote this up and I—You wrote it. 
(Depo. of Daynes at 60, 61) 
Clearly, Dr. Daynes retracted any suggestion or implication 
in his affidavit that Dr. Hurst breached the applicable standard 
of care. Additionally he explained that all he ever intended 
to suggest or state in the affidavit regarding causation was 
that orthodontic treatment is one of many possible causes of 
the plaintiff's alleged symptoms. 
Dr. Daynes is unable and unwilling to testify that 
Dr. Hurst's treatment of plaintiff was improper or breached the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists or 
that Dr. Hurst's treatment, whether negligent or not, is a 
cause of plaintiff's alleged injuries. Accordingly, based on 
Dr. Daynes' deposition testimony, the trial court was correct 
in concluding that Dr. Daynes' testimony does not raise a 
question of fact as to whether Dr. Hurst's treatment complied 
with the applicable standard of care or whether his treatment 
caused plaintiff's alleged injuries. Summary judgment was 
therefore appropriate. 
B. Plaintiff Was Given Adequate Time And Opportunity To 
Consult Experts And Produce Competent Opposing 
Affidavits In Accordance With Rule 56(e), Utah Rules 
Of Civil Procedure. 
On June 6, 1988, the day set for hearing Dr. Hurst's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish Deposition of 
Scott P. Daynes, D.D.S., plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Continuance, asking the court to continue the hearing for at 
least three weeks. (R. at 176) The trial court denied plain-
tiff's motion and on appeal plaintiff claims the lower court 
abused its discretion. 
The trial court initially granted Summary Judgment in 
December 1987. Thereafter plaintiff filed the affidavit of 
Scott Daynes, D.D.S. His affidavit did not comply with Rule 
56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. because it did not affirmatively show 
that Dr. Daynes was competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Specifically, the affidavit did not state that 
Dr. Daynes had any knowledge or familiarity with the standard 
of care ordinarily exercised by orthodontists in 1972 through 
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1974. Perhaps more importantly, the affidavit did not express 
an opinion that Dr. Hurst's treatment caused or probably caused 
plaintiff's alleged injuries. Nevertheless, the trial court 
showed great leniency to plaintiff and allowed her a second 
chance by vacating the Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff served her Notice of Intent to Commence a 
Malpractice Action pursuant to the Health Care Malpractice Act 
in December 1985. (R. at 2, Complaint 1f 4) The Summary 
Judgment from which she appeals was granted in June 1988. (R. 
at 196-197) Thus, plaintiff had two years and five months from 
the time she formally asserted a claim of malpractice against 
Dr. Hurst to obtain expert testimony in support of her claims 
before the Summary Judgment was finally entered. This lawsuit 
had been pending for ten months when the Summary Judgment was 
finally granted. Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the supporting affidavits were filed on November 2, 1987. 
(R. at 15-46) By vacating the first Summary Judgment, the 
trial court allowed plaintiff seven months from the time the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits were 
filed to produce counter-affidavits raising a question of fact, 
before Summary Judgment was finally entered. 
Plaintiff correctly identifies the standard for this 
Court's review of the trial court's refusal to grant plaintiff 
additional time as "abuse of discretion". (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 9) Clearly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to grant plaintiff more time, when she had already 
been allowed seven months to produce counter-affidavits, 
particularly in view of the fact that plaintiff had asserted 
her claims of malpractice nearly two and one-half years 
earlier. In exercising its discretion, the trial court could 
properly consider the rights of the defendant to have claims of 
professional negligence against him promptly resolved. 
C. The Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Not Applicable In 
This Case And Even If It Were Applicable, Competent 
Expert Testimony Would Be Necessary To Raise A 
Question Of Fact Regarding Causation. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have 
recognized the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and therefore 
should not have granted summary judgment. (Appellant's Brief 
at 5) Plaintiff's position is without merit for the following 
reasons: 
1. Res ipsa was not raised by plaintiff's pleadings or 
arguments in the trial court. This Court has consistently held 
it will not consider issues which were not properly raised 
below. Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah S. Ct. 1987); 
Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah S. Ct. 1987). 
2. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to 
the facts of this case. In order to rely on res ipsa loquitur 
a plaintiff must establish a sufficient evidentiary foundation 
to support application of the doctrine, including: 
a. That the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant used due care, 
b. That the instrument or thing causing the injury 
was under the management and control of the defendant, and 
c. That the accident happened irrespective of any 
participation by the plaintiff. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra; Talbot v. Dr. W. H. Groves, Latter 
Day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968); 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) . 
In this case it clearly cannot be said that plaintiffs 
injuries probably would not have occurred without negligence by 
the defendant, or that the instrument or thing causing the 
injury was under the management of the defendant, or that plain-
tiff's alleged injuries happened irrespective of her participa-
tion. According to Dr. Daynes, the symptoms of which plaintiff 
complains could have been caused by numerous factors not under 
the control of Dr. Hurst, including factors directly involving 
plaintiff's participation. Regarding the symptoms plaintiff 
claims resulted from Dr. Hursts' treatment, Dr. Daynes 
testified: 
Q. And isn't it true that those symptoms can be 
caused by a lot of different problems or factors? 
A. Yes sir, absolutely. There's no feeling on my 
part that the fact that she has these symptoms means 
that she has a T.M.J, problem. They may be caused by 
a skeletal abnormality, a growth abnormality, or some 
other thing I'm not able to think of right now, but 
other things may cause these, all of which I may not 
be able to define or know. All I can say is there was 
a possibility of T.M.J, problem because all those 
things are made better by the splint. 
Q. You're just suggesting that T.M.J, dysfunction is 
one of many possible causes of those symptoms? 
A. Yes. 





Q. Even fetal development? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Arthritis? 
A. Developmental. I would include all develop-
mental, possibly neoplastic, which means deformation 
of the developing symptoms, the growth structures. 
Q. Psychological factors. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Anything that causes stress? 
A. Yes. And I would include in there any lifestyle 
problems. In other words, where I mentioned earlier 
about the lifestyle problems may be causing the T.M.J, 
symptoms. 
Q. Things such as drug abuse? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Excessive yawning or opening the mouth 
excessively wide? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Grinding or clenching of her teeth? 
f\. X c* £> . • . . 
Q. The aging process itself may contribute? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And probably a host of other things we haven't 
even identified. 
A. Very much so, and we may not ever be able to 
identify. 
Q. And as I understand your testimony, of all those 
possible causes of Mary's symptoms, you're not able to 
express an opinion as to what the actual cause is? 
A. Absolutely. I wouldn't try to. 
(Depo. of Daynes at 43-45) 
Based on Dr. Daynes' testimony, plaintiff's alleged 
injuries are not of a kind which would not have happened with-
out negligence on the part of defendant. Numerous instruments 
or factors potentially causing plaintiff's alleged injuries 
were not under the control or management of Dr. Hurst and many 
of the potential causes of her alleged injuries involve 
plaintiff's participation. Accordingly, the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case. 
In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, the 
plaintiff entered the defendant hospital for a tonsillectomy. 
During her hospital stay the plaintiff was given three injec-
tions in her left hip. The day after her discharge from the 
hospital, the plaintiff was readmitted with extreme pain and 
inflammation at the injection site and in serious septic 
shock. At the time of her readmission, the physicians involved 
concluded that the infecting organism was Clostridia introduced 
by the needles used for plaintiff's injections. Surgery was 
performed, but later culture results showed the infecting 
organism was beta streptococcus, the most typical cause of 
common tonsillitis, rather than Clostridium. The defendant 
hospital filed a motion for summary judgment based on support-
ing affidavits of one of the physicians and the nurses who 
administered the injections. The affidavits averred that the 
shots had been given in accordance with accepted standards of 
practice for sterility and administration of injections. The 
doctor's affidavit stated that it was probable the plaintiff's 
tonsils were infected with beta strep bacteria and that the 
infection probably spread from her throat to the injection site 
either internally through her blood stream or externally by 
plaintiff or someone else handling the injection site. The 
plaintiff did not file any counter-affidavits, but relied upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that based thereon 
she was not required to produce expert testimony to controvert 
the affidavits filed by the defendant. Plaintiff further 
argued that even if she were required to produce expert 
testimony, she was not required to do so before trial. The 
trial court rejected plaintiff's arguments and granted summary 
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judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment 
stating: 
The evidence in this case, even when viewed most 
favorably to Robinson, does not present sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur. 
There is no expert testimony in the record from which 
it could reasonably be concluded that Robinson's infec-
tion ordinarily would not happen in the absence of 
negligence. Although she did not have to rule out all 
other possible non-negligent causes, she did have to 
offer evidence showing that the balance of proba-
bilities weighed in favor of negligence. 
In order to create a genuine factual dispute on this 
point, Robinson thus had to come forward with evidence 
to counter Dr. Burke's affidavit opinion—that 
non-negligent causes of her infection were 
probable—with expert testimony to the effect that 
Robinson's infection most likely resulted from 
negligence, assuming it was possible to find an expert 
who could and would make such a statement. . . . 
Since appellant did not submit evidence creating a 
genuine issue of fact about the most likely cause of 
her injuries, the trial judge properly proceeded to 
conclude that respondents were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
We agree that trial courts should be extremely 
cautious in granting summary judgment for a defendant 
on the basis that plaintiff has failed to secure 
expert testimony to support a medical negligence 
action. But appellant contends that a plaintiff suing 
on a theory of res ipsa loquitur is always entitled to 
a trial on the merits, so that summary judgment is 
always inappropriate. Such an argument miscomprehends 
the purpose and application of the doctrine, as well 
as the pretrial responsibilities of a plaintiff faced 
with a summary judgment motion. 
Id. at 266-267. 
3. Even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were 
applicable, summary judgment would be appropriate because there 
is no genuine issue of fact regarding causation. 
In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care/ Inc., supra, the 
Court of Appeals explained: 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in 
the proof of negligence; it has no bearing on the 
issue of causation, which must be separately and 
independently established. 
Id. at 266. 
There is no expert opinion or other competent evidence in 
the record controverting the affidavits of Dr. Hurst, Dr. 
Randle, Dr. Guinn, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker, all of which 
establish that plaintiff's alleged injuries were not caused by 
Dr. Hurst's orthodontic treatment. 
D. Plaintiff Has Not Stated A Claim For Relief Based On 
Lack Of Informed Consent. 
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff argues that she did not 
give informed consent to the procedures performed by Dr. Hurst 
when she was twelve years old. (Appellant's Brief at 7) 
Plaintiff's argument is without merit for the following reasons 
1. Her Complaint does not allege a cause of action based 
on lack of informed consent and that theory was not otherwise 
raised in the trial court and therefore cannot be considered by 
this Court on appeal. Sorenson v. Larsen, supra; Topik v. 
Thurber, supra. 
2. One of the elements of a cause of action for failure 
to obtain informed consent which must be proved by the plain-
tiff is that "the unauthorized part of the health care rendered 
was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the 
patient". S 78-14-5(l)(c) & (g), U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
The treatment rendered when plaintiff was eleven or twelve 
years old was the extraction of the incisor and the orthodontic 
treatment commenced in 1972 and concluded in 1974. Even under 
a theory of failure to obtain informed consent, plaintiff would 
have the burden of proving that such treatment caused her 
alleged injuries. As discussed above, the testimony of 
Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle, Dr. Guinn, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker 
is uncontroverted and there is no genuine issue in the record 
regarding causation. 
3. There is no genuine issue of fact in this case 
regarding plaintiff's consent to the treatment rendered by 
Dr. Hurst. Any parent is authorized and empowered to consent 
to health care for his minor child. S 78-14-5(4)(a), U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended) According to the affidavits of Dr. Hurst and 
Dr. Rasmussen, the extraction of plaintiff's incisor and the 
plan for orthodontic treatment were discussed with plaintiff's 
father and he agreed with the plan of treatment. (R. at 16, 
Aff'd of Hurst 1f 4; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 4) Gayle 
Dean Hunt, plaintiff's father, whose affidavit was filed after 
the affidavits of Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen were filed, does 
not controvert the testimony of Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen 
that he agreed to the proposed treatment. He testifies: 
I am Mary Alene Hunt's father. I accompanied Mary to 
consult Dr. Hurst after his examination of her teeth. 
She had sustained a chipped front tooth and the same 
commenced to lean but was not capped and died. 
Dr. Hurst proposed removal of same moving the adjoin-
ing teeth together to fill the resulting gap or 
space. I questioned moving teeth but was assured it 
was a regular procedure. 
(R. at 66) Accordingly, the uncontroverted facts in the record 
are that Dr. Hurst explained the proposed treatment to plain-
tiff's father and her general dentist and they agreed to the 
treatment, including extraction of the incisor and the applica-
tion of orthodontic appliances. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF § 78-14-4, U.C.A. (1953 AS 
AMENDED) BECAUSE THIS ACTION WAS NOT 
COMMENCED WITHIN FOUR YEARS AFTER THE 
ALLEGED NEGLIGENT TREATMENT WHICH PLAINTIFF 
CLAIMS CAUSED HER ALLEGED INJURIES. 
Section 78-14-4 provides: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, . . . (emphasis added) 
Although plaintiff alleges Dr. Hurst's treatment continued 
through 1985, the acts she claims were negligent were the 
extraction of the lower right central incisor and moving the 
other lower anterior teeth to fill the space left by the 
extraction. Plaintiff wore retainers subsequent to 1974, but 
it is uncontroverted that the incisor was extracted in 1972 and 
that by the end of 1974 the remaining lower anterior teeth had 
been moved to reduce the crowding and had evenly taken up the 
space of the extracted tooth. (R. at 17, Aff'd of Hurst; R. at 
38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f1f 5 & 6) 
This Court recently reviewed the application of the four 
year statute of repose in § 78-14-4, in a similar case. In 
Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah S. Ct. 1987), 
Dr. Larsen, the defendant, performed corrective surgery on 
plaintiffs ankle in May 1973. In February 1982, the plaintiff 
allegedly discovered that the surgery had been negligently 
performed and in December 1982 he commenced the lawsuit. The 
plaintiff argued his complaint was timely because it was filed 
within two years of the date his injury was discovered and that 
to apply the four statute of repose in his case would result in 
his claim being extinguished before it was discovered. The 
trial court granted summary judgment and this court affirmed 
holding: 
The trial court appropriately observed that the fore-
going statute is stated in two parts. It is not only 
a statute of limitation; it is also a statute of 
repose. The statute begins to run from the time an 
injured person knows or should know that he has suf-
fered an injury. But in any event, the statute 
requires that an action be commenced within four years 
after the date of the incident which caused the injury. 
Id. at 1337. 
There is no dispute that the treatment which plaintiff 
claims caused her injuries occurred in 1972 through 1974. 
Accordingly, her claims are barred as a matter of law by the 
provisions of § 78-14-4. 
POINT III 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
HAS FAILED TO CITE ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD 
WHICH FACTUALLY SUPPORTS HER CONTENTIONS ON 
APPEAL. 
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the 
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant 
does not support facts set forth in his or her brief with 
citations to the record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 
S. Ct. 1987); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah S. Ct. 
1982). In State v. Tucker, supra, this Court held: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contention on appeal. This Court will assume the 
correctness of the judgment below where counsel on 
appeal does not comply with the requirements of Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to 
making a concise statement of facts and citation of 
the pages in the record where they are supported.1 
Id. at 756-757. 
*Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Rules of Utah Supreme Court, became 
effective in April 1987 and essentially replaced former Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but did not 
change the requirement that an appellant's brief contain a 
statement of facts supported by citations to the record. 
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In this case, appellant's brief does not contain a single 
citation to the record. Accordingly, there are no facts 
properly cited to this Court upon which reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court could be based. It is impossible 
for plaintiff to demonstrate that a question of fact existed 
without citing facts in the record. The Summary Judgment 
should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DR. HURST COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE THE APPEAL IS 
FRIVOLOUS AND BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S RULES. 
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides for 
an award of damages and single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if the Court determines that an 
appeal is frivolous. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a 
frivolous appeal is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis and that lack of good faith is not required to find an 
appeal frivolous. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . 
This appeal is without reasonable legal or factual basis. 
As discussed above, not a single citation to the record is made 
in appellant's brief. Without citing the record, no reasonable 
factual basis for the appeal can be demonstrated. At least two 
arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal were never raised in 
the trial court; res ipsa loquitur and failure to obtain 
informed consent. This Court has consistently held that it 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, 
but plaintiff has ignored that basic time honored rule without 
suggesting any reason why this Court should consider those 
arguments. Plaintiff has filled the record in this case with 
clearly inadmissible materials, without any good faith effort 
to provide the required foundation. (See Addendum hereto) 
Additionally, plaintiff has attempted to put before this Court, 
two purported expert witness affidavits, which were never 
before the trial court. (Dennis J. Michaelson, D.M.D., M.S. 
included as an unnumbered page of the record and filed with the 
District Court more than two months after the Notice of Appeal 
was filed and the purported letter from Grant B. Cannon, 
D.D.S., M.D., Exhibit 10 to Appellant's brief, but not in the 
record.) 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant submits that this 
appeal has no reasonable legal or factual basis and that 
plaintiff's blatant disregard for the rules of this Court and 
the Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate bad faith and the 
frivolous nature of the appeal. Such conduct has greatly and 
unnecessarily increased the cost of defending this action. 
Accordingly, defendant requests that just damages, including 
double costs and reasonable attorneys' fees be awarded to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Dr. Hurst respectfully 
requests that the Order and Summary Judgment entered by the 
District Court be affirmed and that he be awarded double costs 
and attorneys' fees incurred because of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of December, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By L ^ ^ / > 7 * 
David 6/ Williams 
Attorneys for J. Earl Hurst, 




Following is a list of the materials, exclusive of 
Dr. Daynes' affidavit, submitted to the trial court and to this 
Court by plaintiff, purportedly in support of her claim that 
Dr. Hurst was negligent and that his treatment proximately 
caused her alleged injuries. Also set forth are reasons these 
materials do not raise a question of fact regarding the 
propriety of Dr. Hurst's treatment or causation. The various 
affidavits of plaintiff, her father, and Charles Edward Gordon 
are not included, as none of them purport to have any dental 
training or other qualifications as expert witnesses. 
1. Letter from Joseph W. Stobbe, Jr., D.M.D. dated 
December 17, 1987. (R. at 70) Dr. Stobbe's letter is not 
signed under oath and does not affirmatively show that he is 
competent to testify as an expert, as required by Rule 56(e), 
Utah R. Civ. P. Moreover, this letter does not purport to 
address whether Dr. Hurst's treatment was appropriate or 
whether his treatment caused plaintiff's alleged injuries. 
2. Affidavit of Dallas E. Murdoch, D.D.S., dated May 4, 
1988. (R. at 175) Dr. Murdoch's affidavit does not state that 
he has any familiarity with the standard of care ordinarily 
exercised by orthodontists and does not otherwise affirmatively 
show that he is competent to testify as an expert. Addition-
ally, Dr. Murdoch does not express any opinion regarding the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Hurst or regarding whether 
Dr. Hurst's treatment was within the applicable standard of 
care. At most, he suggests that the type of occlusal relation-
ship plaintiff had in May 1988 "can" trigger a variety of 
health problems. He does not express an opinion that plain-
tiff's alleged injuries were or probably were caused by her 
orthodontic treatment. 
3. Excerpt of Lecture to Dentists, September 1986, by 
Dr. Henry Tanner. (R. at 183-184) This document was submitted 
to the trial court on June 13, 1988, a week after the second 
Summary Judgment was granted. It was submitted without any 
foundation. It is not in affidavit form or attached to or 
incorporated in an affidavit. Additionally, the document does 
not purport to address the standard of care applicable to 
orthodontists in treating cases such as plaintiff presented to 
Dr. Hurst and does not purport to address the cause of plain-
tiff's alleged injuries. 
According to the court's file (R. at 199) a cassette tape, 
purportedly the tape from which this excerpt was transcribed, 
was also submitted to the court on June 14, 1988. The tape has 
all the same evidentiary deficiencies, including specifically a 
total lack of foundation. The content of the tape is unknown 
because it was not offered or played at any hearing and was 
never provided to Dr. Hurst or his counsel. 
4. Affidavit of John R. Bybee, dated June 13, 1988. (R. 
at 185) This affidavit was also submitted to the trial court a 
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week after the second Summary Judgment was entered. It states 
John R. Bybee has a Ph.D. in "physiology and the training of 
science teachers", but does not affirmatively state any qualifi-
cations making him competent to testify regarding the standard 
of care exercised by orthodontists or the cause of plaintiff's 
alleged injuries. Additionally, the affidavit does not state 
that John Bybee is familiar with the treatment rendered by 
Dr. Hurst and does not address the propriety of such treatment 
or express any opinion as to the cause of plaintiff's alleged 
injuries. 
5. Letters and proposed contract addressed to Robert 
Macri from Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys and The 
Medical Quality Foundation. (R. at 192-195) These are 
materials sent to plaintiff's counsel by an expert witness 
locating agency. They were filed with the court a week after 
the second Summary Judgment was granted. The materials do not 
contain any expert opinions regarding Dr. Hurst's treatment or 
the cause of plaintiff's problems and obviously do not comply 
with Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. with respect to the form of 
evidence submitted to controvert affidavits filed in support of 
a motion for summary judgment. 
6. Letter dated June 14, 1988, from Gordon J. 
Christensen, D.D.S., Ph.D. (R. at 204) This letter was filed 
with the court on June 21, 1988, two weeks after the Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. The letter is not 
signed under oath. It is not signed by Dr. Christensen. It 
does not affirmatively show that Dr. Christensen or the person 
signing the letter is competent to testify regarding the issues 
in this case. The letter does not express any opinion that 
Dr. Hurst's treatment was negligent or in any way inappropriate. 
7. Handwritten note dated June 15, 1988 from John Richard 
Oaki, M.P. (R. at 205) Again, this note is not in the form 
prescribed by Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. for evidence sub-
mitted to controvert affidavits filed in support of motions for 
summary judgment. It was also filed two weeks after the Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. Dr. Aoki, according 
to the material submitted, is an otorhinolaryngologist and 
there is no indication that he claims any familiarity with the 
standard of care exercised by orthodontists. He does not 
express an opinion concerning the propriety of the treatment 
rendered by Dr. Hurst. 
8. Affidavit of Dennis J. Michaelson, P.M.P., M.S. dated 
September 13, 1988. This affidavit is the last document, other 
than the clerk's index, in the court file and is not numbered 
as part of the record. It was filed September 20, 1988, more 
than two months after the notice of appeal was filed. Again, 
this affidavit does not affirmatively show that the affiant is 
competent to testify as an expert regarding the issues in this 
case. The affiant does not state that he has any familiarity 
with the treatment rendered to plaintiff by Pr. Hurst and does 
not express an opinion concerning the propriety of Dr. Hurst's 
treatment. He opines that in September 1988 plaintiff had some 
occlusal and dentally related problems, but does not express 
any opinion regarding the cause of such problems. 
9. Letter dated July 8, 1988, from Grant B. Cannon, 
D.D.S., M.D. This letter is Exhibit 10 to Appellant's brief, 
but is not found in the record or in the court file. Again, 
this letter does not comply with the requirements of Rule 
56(e), Utah R. Civ. P., for evidence submitted to controvert 
affidavits filed in support of motions for summary judgment. 
The letter does not affirmatively show that Dr. Cannon is 
familiar with the standard of care exercised by orthodontists. 
The letter is not signed under oath. Furthermore, Dr. Cannon 
does not purport to express an opinion that Dr. Hurst's 
treatment was in any way inappropriate or caused plaintiff's 
alleged injuries. 
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